A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
By
David Travers
Department of Politics and International Relations
Lancaster University
1 I have been asked to provide a memorandum which critically explores four areas that are of importance in assessing your work: first the criteria used in your study; secondly the effectiveness of selected institutions in terms of their stated objectives, thirdly the accountability of institutional behaviour and fourthly whether it is possible to deliver public goods by alternative means. (In order to keep this paper relatively brief I have explored only two aspects of the United Nations: peacekeeping and the use of sanctions. I have cut from the paper a section on the role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. If you are interested in my comments on these I can send them under separate cover.)
2 First I wonder whether the criteria that you have used might not encompass all the political, diplomatic, administrative and legal activities that take place towards, within and without international institutions. Financial resources presumably include regular assessed contributions, special ad hoc contributions, voluntary earmarked funds in which the donor specifies the uses to which the money may be put, and voluntary funds that remained undesignated. But one of the hallmarks of financing international institutions is that it is highly political. First states debate constantly whether the most appropriate criteria are being used to determine the capacity to pay of each individual member. Secondly large contributors to the regular budget expect to wield political influence commensurate to their assessment. When they feel that this is not so they might delay payment, withhold funds especially for items in which they were, or, might, be outvoted; and tie their arrears payments to specific changes in behaviour they desire in the institution. Thirdly there are always states that for a variety of reasons pay late and states which cannot pay in part or in full because of conditions economic, social and political beyond their immediate control. Fourthly, it might be claimed, that by earmarking funds: states might be distorting the core aims of the institution; that they might be using the institution as an instrument of their foreign policy; and that they might be making the secretariat more responsive to them and their friends rather than serving the institution as a whole. And a further problem with examining the sums of money available to international institutions is whether the researcher has information on the peaks and the troughs in the payment cycle and whether the secretariat has, at certain times in the financial year, to cross borrow from other funded activities in order to pay for regular budgeted tasks. And finally it would be important to know whether sums of money are expressed in constant dollars/yen and what the changing purchasing power might be.
3 The question of the human resources available to an institution might also raise difficulties. First there is the degree to which there is transparency in job description, timely recruitment and sensitive promotion within secretariats. There are the perennial problems of reconciling merit with geographical representation; the relationship between career and seconded staff; the appropriate secretariat quota for each state; the speed with which un- represented states can obtain secretariat posts; the extent to which the large states and groupings of states believe that particular posts are their personal fiefdoms; and the degree to which the disparate parts of the secretariat can be successfully co-ordinated. There are also the questions of secretariat ethos, the degree to which there is strategic planning, staff training, effective management and the extent to which there is regular, honest and reliable oversight of performance and delivery. Secondly institutions face difficulties in recruiting specialised staff particularly for preventive activities, peacemaking and mediation, peacekeeping, advising upon and monitoring sanctions violations and for coercive purposes. This can, in the case of peacekeeping for example, affect the speed of deployment, the atmosphere between the disputing parties and the degree to which the mandate can be fulfilled. And the third issue is the extent to which human resources can adjust to changing issues and political atmospheres and meet new challenges and in field operations changing conditions on the ground.
4 A discussion of legislative output might also provide problems because the range of factors that has to be considered is so large. Normally one would expect an analysis to include the following: (which is not exhaustive) the constitution and its evolution; rules of procedure; the voting majority required; the extent to which national capitals regarded an issue as important and are willing to mobilise their diplomatic network in search of votes; the importance of governmental and group behaviour particularly the extent to which time is spent in constructive informal consultations; the extent to which new financial resources will be required; the degree to which new precedents might be established; the tone of the debate; the political atmosphere; the political skills and influence of the secretariat; the degree to which delegations draw upon knowledge about a particular topic/issue from the secretariat and its advisors and consultants, other international institutions, non -government organisations and the media; the quality of the drafting and the degree and depth of support for the resolution across all the political groupings within the institution and the reasons for any sustained, critical opposition to the resolution.
5 The second area that you asked me to examine was to examine the degree to which selected international institutions and programmes had achieved their stated objectives. First I think that any examination of the United Nations has to place the institution in a political context. The United Nations has to work within a number of constraints some of which I have already alluded to.
- The drafters of the charter did not anticipate the atomic and nuclear age, nor the use of chemical and biological weapons; nor the number of civil wars with international consequences- the Charter assumed that organised violence would be between rather than within states; nor the emergence of irresponsible non states entities with the capacity to wage violence- liberation movements, secession groups and ethnic militia groups.
- Member states did not always honour their legal obligations that they could use force only in self or collective defence or with the permission of the Security Council.
- There has to be a collective will in the political organs to discuss problems of international peace and security.
- The threat or actual use of the veto in the Security Council by one of the permanent members; the difficulties of obtaining a two- thirds majority in the General Assembly.
- The absence of armed forces dedicated to United Nations use because during the onset of the Cold War the permanent members were unable to agree upon the size, the composition and the location of the armed forces. As a consequence member states were unable to enter into agreements with the Security Council to provide elements of their armed forces for United Nations duty under chapters 6 and 7. Member states therefore have to offer their armed forces and other resources on a voluntary basis for each peacekeeping or coercive use and each operation is likely to ad hoc. Equally member states can withdraw their forces at will from any United Nations operation.
- Member states do not always honour their legal obligation to carry out Security Council orders to undertake arms and trade sanctions.
- Member states do not always pay their regular and peacekeeping dues either on time, in full or without conditions.
- The secretariat has to overcome internal fiefdoms, political interference and co-ordination difficulties and often faces difficulties in recruiting personnel for field missions.
- Effective and timely planning by the secretariat based upon reliable, contemporary information.
- A clear, practical and attainable mandate, which is constantly monitored and, if and when necessary, adjusted to changing conditions on the ground. A peacekeeping mission should not be deployed simply because the Security Council cannot think of anything else at the time.
- Rapid deployment of the necessary numbers of voluntarily supplied armed forces and civilians with the required skills and with the necessary logistic support.
- Effective instructions from the secretariat for the mission head and the force commander; and full operational control over national contingents by the force commander rather than the contributing governments.
- Sustained political and financial support from all the members particularly the permanent. And if necessary voluntary contributions either in kind or financial already in place before the operation rather than simply pledged.
- The mission must be seen to act without bias and use the minimum degree of force necessary should it be prevented from carrying out its mission or if it comes under sustained armed attack.
- The mission must receive full co-operation from all the parties.
- The host or hosts whether governments or political factions must not withdraw consent to having a peacekeeping force on their territory before the tasks of the operation have been completed.
8 First the secretariat is not always in a position to provide timely, knowledgeable and sustained mission planning because of the number of concurrent peacekeeping operations; because it is unable to obtain the appropriate mix of specialised personnel; because it is unable to undertake an optimum number of visits to the location of the potential mission; because security concerns restrict the scope, the area and the length of a mission visit, because the planners are presented wittingly or unwittingly with either incomplete or false information by the parties to the dispute ( which is particularly important where disarmament of combatants is an essential feature of the proposed mandate) because knowledge is not always shared among different parts of the secretariat and because the secretariat is not always willing to present information that might be unpalatable to the permanent members.
9 Secondly the secretariat's ability to provide reasoned political, military and logistic advice to the Security Council varies depending upon the number of suitably qualified advisors particularly military, the number and quality of the available secretariat officials, the degree of co-operation and co -ordination among the various parts of the secretariat; the quality of available information and the time schedule.
10 Thirdly the strength and depth and extent of support from the political organs varies depending upon the degree to which there is, and continues to be, a common view of the nature of the problem and the means by which it might be managed and resolved. It will also be affected by the degree to which the members of the Security Council act on the political and military advice of the Secretariat and respond to reasoned requests from the secretariat for advice on how to interpret resolutions many of which are deliberately ambiguous. On occasions, the Security Council members want to be seen to be doing something in a crisis situation yet not to accept responsibility. Therefore they ask the secretary general to execute a resolution, which is likely to be unachievable knowing in advance that if, and when, he fails he can be used as a scapegoat thus deflecting any criticism from them.
11 Fourthly the secretariat often faces difficulties in obtaining militarily efficient, properly equipped and politically neutral armed forces and supporting personnel. Sometimes it receives troops who are ill dressed, improperly equipped and has to provide suitable clothing and training before the troops can become operationally efficient which is both time consuming and expensive. Sometimes it has to accept troops from states that have a keen political, ideological or religious interest in a dispute. The Secretariat has also faced a persistent problem of obtaining civilian policemen. The United Nations often has to repatriate some policemen because they are not proficient in the missions working languages, cannot drive and have little knowledge of human rights and humanitarian law. The United Nations often cannot deploy a mission quickly- although both the secretariat and interested member-states are seeking to and appear to be overcoming this problem to some degree. (See the deployment of the missions to Ethiopia and Eritrea and Afghanistan) This is partly because there is not normally a ready prepared military staff headquarters, partly because very few states have troops on short stand -by notice, partly because few states have armed forces that are trained and equipped for a variety of terrain and climates, partly because skilled civilian personnel and civilian police are difficult to recruit and retain and partly because the budget for the operation often requires that heavy equipment is sent by sea rather than by air.
12 Fifthly missions require both the civil head and the military commander to be politically skilled and diplomatically sensitive. They need to provide visible leadership for the mission; they need to be on excellent personal terms; they need to maintain close ties with the local leaders; and they need to communicate regularly and honestly with United Nations headquarters about the progress of the mission particularly its difficulties, with suggestions for changes in the mandate if the existing one is proving inadequate. (The Departments of Peacekeeping and perhaps of Political Affairs will normally decide whether these suggestions are likely to receive a favourable response from members of the Council- see the important telegram from the force commander in Rwanda providing details of the future genocide which was not passed on because it was judged that members of the Council would not be receptive.) These attributes are seldom in abundant supply. A further problem is that when the Secretary General selects these staff he has to pay some attention to geographical distribution and also ensure that they are acceptable to members of the Security Council, the troop contributing states, the major financial contributors and the parties. This may restrict his choice even further. Yet another problem is that the force commander's instructions are often subject to contributing state veto. This is particularly noticeable in operations where, soldiers may be challenged and have to resort to force, or where a contributing state objects to a changing mandate which it refuses to allow its troops to execute.
13 Sixthly the budgets for peacekeeping missions can be restricted with consequential operational effects because states do not pay their peacekeeping dues on time, in full and without conditions. And a financial veto may be used to prevent either the establishment, or the expansion of a mission. Moreover some elements of a mission that are critical to its success such as the disarmament and integration of combatants into society often rests upon voluntary contributions rather than the assessed peacekeeping budget.
14 Seventhly the operational efficiency of the military aspects of a mission can also be adversely affected because the United Nations is unable to provide the necessary logistical support for the different military contingents' equipment.
15 Eighthly the mission can be fundamentally affected by the degree, extent and durability of co-operation from the parties. Without a modicum of co-operation any peacekeeping mission is likely to find it difficult, indeed probably impossible to achieve its purposes.
16 Ninthly the mission can be adversely affected if there is interference on the ground by outside states and other entities. Sometimes a mission may request help from the diplomatic community in the area of the operation if it is facing local difficulties, which might be resolved, if the obdurate party realises the degree to which the work of the mission is supported internationally. But sometimes diplomats may protest to the mission that it is exceeding its mandate; sometimes one of the parties might receive diplomatic, political, financial and various types of military support from friendly states who object to part or sometimes to the whole of a mandate.
17 Tenthly the ability of the mission to achieve its objectives may depend upon the degree to which it can collect or receive vital information/intelligence. The United Nations secretariat often claims that peacekeeping is a neutral instrument, that peacekeepers do not have enemies and therefore do not need intelligence. But if peacekeeping often takes place in environments where the necessary operational conditions are seldom present, where armed groups are often prepared to use violence against peacekeepers performing their prescribed duties, and where peacekeepers are expected to escort humanitarian convoys through often hostile areas advanced knowledge of potential difficulties is often vital to prevent loss of life and damage to the image of the mission and indeed the United Nations generally. But the need for, and means of collection of, intelligence remains in dispute.
18 Next missions have been affected differently by the deliberate seizure, abduction and killing of UN peacekeepers. In some instances the United Nations has responded with the use of force, sometimes states have withdrawn their contingents; and sometimes one of the permanent members has offered to support the mission with their own armed forces, which remain under their own operational control and not the United Nations. This technique worked well in Sierra Leone but proved disastrous in Somalia when the United States embarked on an operation without the approval or knowledge of the United Nations command. This led to loss of life among United States servicemen and the subsequent withdrawal of American military support for the mission.
19 Yet other effects of the use of force occurred in Bosnia where NATO was invited to use aircraft to enforce the no fly zones, provide close air support for the UN operation when soldiers were attacked and to help in the protection of the safe areas. First there was a culture clash between the two organisations- one was a peacekeeping and peacemaking institution, the other a war making machine whose reputation depended on how effectively its used military violence. Secondly, the use of force by NATO, often resulted in the United Nations being unable to fulfil its functions- military observers were seized and used as human shields against further attacks, and the Bosnian Serbs refused to allow the United Nations to deliver humanitarian assistance to enclaves within the areas controlled by their armed forces. Furthermore after the fall of two of the six safe areas NATO effectively took command of the United Nations operation in Bosnia. It accused the Serbs of violating Security Council resolutions, then used aircraft to attack ammunition dumps and communications centres and only stopped the bombing campaign when its military officers and the local United Nations commander and not the Secretary General's Personal Representative and United Nations Headquarters, decided that the NATO terms had been met.
20 Finally the United Nations has often been weak in public relations although this is now improving with the use of the world wide web, e-mail and a greater awareness of the harmful effects of bad publicity. The United Nations secretariat has realised that it is important to explain to the local people and the world what the United Nations mission is, what it hopes to achieve and the problems that it is seeking to overcome. In some missions the United Nations has had to contend with radio hate campaigns and programmes of dis-information encouraged or even sponsored by the parties. But this remains a difficult area because the UN is often dependent upon member states to loan the secretariat skilled public relations practitioners.
21 A further question that you raised was whether peacekeeping could be delivered in other ways. I think that there are three. First there is the use of a single state or a coalition of states. The imprimatur of the Security Council would be sought. The participating state or states would pay their own costs. But doubts might be raised about the balance between pursuing international and national goals. There would be worries about the extent to which United Nations peacekeeping standards would be maintained. There would be concerns about the mission's degree of accountability to the Security Council- how often would there be reports and in how much detail and would these be subjected to debate by Council and if there was dissatisfaction would the Council be able to withdraw the mandate. (This of course would depend to what extent a permanent member was involved because it could always prevent any change in the mandate by threatening or actually using the veto.) And finally there would be the question of whether the mission had a suitable exit strategy or whether the United Nation would be expected to pick up the pieces.
22 This technique has been useful where a coalition has created the necessary conditions for a United Nations peacekeeping force to become operable e.g. the Australian led coalition that restored peace to East Timor after the violence that followed the referendum where a clear majority of the electorate voted for independence. But this is peace enforcement and not peacekeeping. NATO has also provided hybrid forces that have elements of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in both Bosnia and Kosovo. But some commentators might argue that this is peacekeeping in the context of the former because the force was there to help the parties carry out a peace agreement, where as in Kosovo the force has to create the conditions to enable normal policing to return.
23 A second alternative is regional peacekeeping. But the first problem is: are there effective regional organisations in all geographical areas of the globe? Secondly how many regional organisations have the capacity to mount a peacekeeping operation quickly that is regarded as neutral and impartial by the parties and does not get drawn into the dispute and makes the problem worse. Thirdly to what degree do regional institutions regard themselves as accountable to the Security Council. The United Nations, however, has assumed a new peacekeeping role in that it now monitors regional peacekeeping as it did with the OAS in the Dominican Republic as early as 1965, ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Commonwealth of Independent States in Georgia. And it has developed a range of means of co-operating with regional agencies in peacekeeping including liaison, exchanging information and joint missions.
24 A third alternative is to consider whether private security firms can undertake peacekeeping? Private firms have already had a very limited role in certain aspects of peacekeeping: they have provided logistical support and recruited personnel and in complex emergencies they have provided security for non -governmental -organisation facilities, personnel and humanitarian convoys. But there are serious limitations upon private companies undertaking the whole of a peacekeeping operation. First would the Security Council delegate responsibility for helping to maintain international peace and security to a private firm, which would be permitted to use force in self -defence or to achieve its mandate? Secondly would such a firm be capable of recruiting and deploying quickly large numbers of properly equipped personnel? Thirdly would the secretariat and member states support such a development especially if they were asked to assist the private firm in fulfilling the mandate? Thus there seems to be legal, political and logistical constraints upon private firms conducting other than highly specialised, but relatively modest, functions in peacekeeping.
25 Yet another question you raised was about accountability. Accountability can take a number of forms: political, administrative, financial, and legal. In the case of peacekeeping the Secretary-General seeks to provide legal and political accountability by reporting regularly to the Security Council and seeking legal, political and practical advice when changes in the mandate are contemplated. (He also provides regular reports on matters of concern to the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.) The Secretariat and the Council attempt to provide accountability to force contributing states by holding regular meetings and consultations and various permutations of meeting format are still being explored. Financial accountability is exercised by the Administrative and Budgetary Committee, which examines and if necessary suggests reductions in peacekeeping budgets to the fifth committee whose recommendations in turn are usually endorsed by the Assembly in Plenary. In addition the Office for Internal Oversight has made peacekeeping operations a special concern since its inception in 1994. There are now resident auditors and investigators serving with peacekeeping missions who audit, investigate financial irregularities and if necessary provide evidence for possible prosecution. It is likely that the presence of these officials deters irregular financial activities including bribery, extortion and stealing and that as a result of their activities financial management has distinctly improved, monies have been recovered and guilty staff dismissed and in some cases prosecuted and sentence to terms of imprisonment. The Office also attempts to ensure that good practice becomes part of the institutional memory of the secretariat and that mistakes and errors and omissions are rectified as quickly as possible. Indeed the Office reports regularly to the General Assembly on the extent to which its recommendations have been adopted and acted upon. But there is a fundamental weakness in the Internal Oversight Budget: 74 posts including all the resident auditors and investigators with peacekeeping missions are funded from voluntary contributions; indeed over one third of the operating budget of the office is supported from extra-budgetary sources.
26 Finally the legal division of the secretariat helps to resolve any problems that might emerge between the United Nations and companies supplying goods and services to peacekeeping operations. And it also deals with any third party that threatens to sue the United Nations especially for damage allegedly sustained during peacekeeping operations.
27 An Assessment of United Nations Sanctions between 1990 and 2002. I have divided this part of the paper into four sections: first context; second design of sanctions; third monitoring and finally enforcement.
28 First the context: the need for any sanctions resolution to receive sufficient support in the Security Council particularly from the permanent five with their veto; secondly the uneven application of sanctions by member states; and thirdly the institutional weaknesses of the United Nations in monitoring and enforcing sanctions.
29 Sanctions are an attempt to persuade a miscreant to change its lawbreaking behaviour and conform to international norms or demands.
- The Security Council creates sanctions regimes usually after declaring that a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or aggression has taken place.
- There have been 14 sanctions regimes since 1990. One in the Middle East (Iraq), two in Europe the first against Yugoslavia, the second against Yugoslavia and Kosovo Liberation Army; two in Asia: Cambodia and the Taliban in Afghanistan; one in Central America: Haiti and 8 in Africa: Somalia, Libya, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia/Eritrea.
A number of important developments have taken place.
- First the range of purposes for which sanctions have been used has been greatly extended: it includes reversing aggression; restoring democratically elected governments, protecting human rights, ending a variety of wars by reducing the means of violence and encouraging negotiation; bringing suspected terrorists to justice; and sanctioning sanctions violators.
- Secondly the range of targets now includes states, entities, firms and individuals.
- Thirdly there has been a movement away from comprehensive sanctions towards selective sanctions since 1994. There have been three comprehensive regimes: Iraq, Yugoslavia and Haiti and 11 selective, targeted or smart sanctions which have included the following:
- 5 diplomatic sanction including restrictions upon participation in international institutions;
- 6 financial
- 7 commodity sanctions including oil, diamonds and timber;
- 8 travels sanctions including named individuals and restrictions on national or entity airlines
- 12 arms embargoes: 7 alongside other smart sanctions and 5 standing on their own.
31 Why have no comprehensive sanctions been imposed since 1994?
- First the question was raised whether the correct target for sanctions had been selected: the general population was the target. The theory suggests that governments respond to the economic deprivation of their populations who express their discontent in a variety of ways- but do authoritarian regimes act in this way? The population in these cases is normally under constant surveillance by the secret police, has no ready means of demonstrating its discontent and moreover the government can protect itself and those in a position to overthrow it by having access to state resources. Thus those in these positions can be protected from the effects of sanctions, the general public cannot.
- Next sanctions can stimulate the creation of black markets, organised crime and smuggling and the profiteers may be the government and its close allies, which might reduce the official interest in changing policy to ensure that sanctions will be lifted.
- Comprehensive sanctions may unify much of the population behind the government, there might well be renewed nationalism and indeed any opposition to the government and those policies that had brought it into international odium might well be diluted or indeed undermined.
- Furthermore a target government may use the suffering of the population, which it has deliberately failed to alleviate as a propaganda tool to depict the country as a victim rather than as a culprit. Humanitarian assistance from the international community to feed the whole or vulnerable parts of the population -like children, pregnant women, nursing mothers, the old, the sick and the mentally ill -might be unable to offset some of the suffering of the population because the target government has either prevented, delayed, withheld or manipulated this assistance.
- It was also believed that comprehensive sanctions might inflict extensive damage to the productive capacity of the state, it might affect the development objectives of the state and also complicate the work of humanitarian agencies and non governmental organisations who might be unable to import certain types of goods and have to face long delays in obtaining exemptions from the sanctions committees.
- And the final criticism was that third parties were affected by sanctions especially those states who traded most heavily with target state yet despite the work of an expert panel commissioned by the General Assembly there is still no agreed method of calculating compensation or how funds might be raised to pay that compensation.
33 Next there has been a sharp improvement in the precision with which resolutions are drafted. Sanctions against named airlines now include, for example, spare parts and insurance; arms sanctions now include training and technical assistance.
34 Sixthly sanctions resolutions may have time limits requiring a formal decision of the Council for further extension.
35 Seventhly the Council has adopted a variety of methods in deciding whether or not the target has met the objectives of the sanctions: sanctions may be progressively removed as objectives are met; sanctions may be lifted for a period and then finally terminated if good behaviour continues; sanctions may be suspended but not terminated and sanctions may lapse if the Council does not renew them.
36 Monitoring. Each sanction regime has its own monitoring committee, which is a subsidiary body of the Security Council. Monitoring has suffered from institutional weaknesses.
- First the chairman of each committee is the representative from a non- permanent member of the Council. The personality and energy of the chairmen are very important. If the appointment takes place at the beginning of the non permanent member's representation on the Council he or she will serve a maximum of two years. Furthermore some chairmen, especially from small missions, might find difficulty in devoting sufficient time to this task given the range of onerous duties they might already have.
- A second weakness is that the other 14 members of the committee may be rotated to other diplomatic posts.
- And a third weakness is that the committee is staffed by a very small number of international officials. Thus there is an important question of the extent to which there is an institutional memory for each sanctions regime and sanctions in general.
- And yet another weakness is that not all states and other interested parties respond to enquiries from the committee either fully or in a timely fashion.
- First chairmen of committees now tend to travel to establish the extent to which sanctions are being effective, negotiate with and encourage states, entities, companies and individuals to support sanctions. But the government of the Chairmen rather than the United Nations often pays for this travel.
- Secondly committees have held open hearings on the efficacy of sanctions receiving information from a wide variety of sources.
- Thirdly the Security Council has appointed expert panels to investigate how and by whom, sanctions have been violated. These panels have produced 17 detailed reports in which they have named states, companies and individuals responsible for sanctions busting and suggested how the enforcement of sanctions might be improved. A number of panels have become almost full time monitoring mechanisms in which they explore alleged violations that are reported to the sanctions committee.
- Another interesting development was the use of a private security firm: Kroll Associates to trace the finances of the UNITA rebel movement.
- First the military from some states has been used in enforcing some sanctions: Iraq and Yugoslavia.
- Secondly the United Nations has asked regional organisations to enforce sanctions: EGOMOC in relation to Sierra Leone.
- Thirdly regional organisations with the assistance of certain states have responded to requests from governments seeking help in enforcing sanctions. Thus the EU, the WEU and associated states like the United States, Canada and Switzerland provided sanctions assistance missions to states contiguous to the former Yugoslavia and the Danube. They also developed a database of violators and provided help to the United Nations sanctions committee on humanitarian exemptions.
- Fourthly private industry associations and companies have been involved in the enforcement of diamond and financial sanctions.
- And finally the Security Council after seeking advice from an expert panel on the enforcement of certain of the sanctions against the Taliban decided to establish United Nations sanctions assistance teams for the states adjoining Afghanistan. And the expert panel on Somalia has recently recommended the establishment of a UN enforcement office in Nairobi.
39 It is difficult to believe that United Nations sanctions can be replicated in any other way. First the United Nations is a quasi- universal international institution. Secondly the Security Council can pass binding resolutions. Thirdly the Council has now taken action against sanction busters including states. And fourthly the Council has proved very responsive to humanitarian concerns. But it is very difficult to measure the degree to which sanctions have been effective: first sanctions may have primary, secondary and tertiary purposes. Secondly even if the target state proves responsive it is difficult to know to what degree this was due to sanctions rather than other factors. Yet there is evidence that indicates that sanctions particularly comprehensive have induced governments to reconsider their behaviour as in the former Yugoslavia. Smart sanctions, however, have not always fulfilled their objectives of inducing change without appearing to, or actually, incurring humanitarian and third party costs. And the United Nations had found it difficult to counter information campaigns conducted by target entities such as the Taliban against which targeted sanctions had been imposed. The Secretary General pointed out that the United Nations had very limited means to inform Afghans about the decisions of the Council, and was unable to counter public misrepresentations or to project an objective perspective on the role and the scope of the sanctions. There was a widespread perception that the sanctions did indeed hurt the population which, they had been specifically designed to avoid.
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