Low Cost of Special Rapporteurs
Thomas G. Weiss (1)
The human rights machinery of the United Nations (UN) is frequently and justly criticized for ineptitude and lack of courage. Budgetary cutbacks are one of the possible outcomes of this project and a widely discussed lever in the Western literature in general. But such an approach is hardly reasonable for a sector that traditionally has received less than one percent of the world organization's budget.
In many evaluations and criticisms, one mechanism is often overlooked that has both superior impact and extremely low costs. The use of special rapporteurs is an illustration of what might be done elsewhere and could justify expanded contributions. (2)
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) appointed its first special rapporteur in 1979, to report on the human rights situation in Chile under Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship. This initiative established an important precedent, the establishment of special procedures to examine serious human rights violations in any country. In 1982 for the first time, a thematic rapporteurship also was set up to examine summary and arbitrary executions.
The 53 member states of the CHR have generally taken steps towards constructing a worldwide system for monitoring human rights. In mid-2002 there were 41 special rapporteurs: 30 on thematic issues, and 11 working in specific countries. The distribution by regional group and gender is the African group, 10 (7 men and 3 women); the Asian group, 12 (8 men and 3 women, one person to be nominated); the Eastern European group, 4 (2 men and 2 women); the Western European and other group 8 (6 men and 1 woman, one person to be nominated); and the Latin American and Caribbean group, 7 (5 men and 2 women). (3)
The accountability and the autonomy of these special rapporteurs would be substantially improved if governments were to support a selection process that was less inscrutable and more transparent. At present, appointments are entirely controlled by the chair of the Commission on Human Rights and hence subject to the vagaries of his or her personality and vision.
Moreover, special rapporteurs should be entirely independent, but at present they must have at least the acquiescence of their own governments before being appointed. Many civil society organizations, especially since the CHR's 58th session in spring 2002, criticize the growing politicization of an appointment process in which the expertise of candidates often appears to be secondary to their political acceptability.
A special concern is the appointment of special rapporteurs who originate from the same region in which their mandate is exercised. During the 58th session, for example, the African group insisted on appointing a specific person actually named in the resolution on racism, clearly contrary to established procedures and common sense. There is no need to discuss the merits or demerits of this particular individual in order to lament the unfortunate precedent. Western governments should never have permitted this action, which in fact was criticized vociferously by civil society organizations because of the precedent-setting implications as well as the perceived threat to the autonomy of appointments. (4) They should agree to no such future resolutions.
During her tenure, Mary Robinson has secured a few additional resources for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). But mandates for special rapporteurs proliferate without any significant increase in the resources to back-stop them in any meaningful way. Special rapporteurs, in my view, should be supported more adequately and be a priority for the newly-named Sergio Vieira de Mello.
While there have been some notable successes, one of the biggest shortcomings in standard operating procedures concerns the fact that special rapporteurs must secure invitations from member states covered by their mandates. Western governments should push to move beyond a system in which the country under scrutiny holds an effective veto over invitations to monitor behavior. At a minimum, diplomatic efforts and financial incentives should be extended by donors in order to build upon a precedent and enlarge the membership in a small but growing group consisting of 38 forthcoming countries, which have issued "standing invitations."
Part of the problem in appreciating the impact of special rapporteurs results from the fact than many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as national governments only have one "model" in mind for human rights monitors. This is a highly-visible advocate who uses high-decibel levels and public denunciations. If this is the standard, then special rapporteurs do not measure up.
However, special rapporteurs are a hybrid between a free-wheeling NGO and a more staid UN staff member. Much criticism of special rapporteurs resembles that of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which believes that discretion has its advantages in terms of enhanced access and credibility as an interlocutor for a target government. In at least some cases, behind-the-scenes lobbying and discreet hard-work with governments can lead to break-throughs. The heightened mobility and visibility of Burmese dissident Aung San Suu Kyi undoubtedly has as much to do with low-key UN pressure as with high-decibel criticism from NGOs. The impact of UN special rapporteurs and NGOs working on human rights should be viewed as complementary and mutually reinforcing.
Evaluations of the cost-effectiveness of special rapporteurs should also consider that they are "volunteers." While they have the status of "experts on an official mission" and enjoy a series of privileges and immunities applying to UN officials while in the field, in fact, they receive no compensation. Only travel related expenses are reimbursed. The logic of pro bono service is that special rapporteurs are more autonomous and are less constrained than highly compensated officials (that is, at the level of Under-Secretary-General). It is hard to imagine a better return on limited investment.
Indeed, the possibilities for making use of independent senior officials and scholars should be explored. For instance, Maurice Strong has often worked full-time for $1 a year. And Francis M. Deng, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons, has a similar arrangement but raises his own funding in order to guarantee independence.
Western governments should push to expand the time available for independent presentations by special rapporteurs. At the 2002 session of the CHR, for instance, the speaking time for many special rapporteurs was cut to five minutes-clearly far too short a time even to introduce their reports let alone debate their substance in the plenary.
Much criticism of international institutions takes place in a vacuum. In thinking about the impact of special rapporteurs, Western governments should remember that the annual renewal of country mandates necessitates short-term perspectives from the world organization. How could there be anything like a long-term vision when such minimal financing is an on-going preoccupation? Special rapporteurs, like much of the UN system, are obliged to emphasize small steps rather than more ambitious strategies. Incremental progress is thus far more likely than any dramatic break-throughs unless donors adopt longer-term horizons for mandates. As none of the problems with which they deal, including country briefs, is likely to disappear, expanding the time horizon would seem a logical step.
Notes
(1) Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York and Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, where he is also co-director of the United Nations Intellectual History Project and editor of Global Governance. In 2000-2001 he served as research director of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
(2) See Seventeen Frequently Asked Questions Aabout United Nations Special Rapporteurs, Human Rights Fact Sheet no.27. Resolutions on special procedures, mandates, and reports are found at www.unhchr.ch.
(3) These numbers do not include two new mandates established by the Commission on Human Rights at its 58th Session (2002) and submitted to the Economic and Social Council for early approval in document E/2002/L.7: Special Rapport on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and Working group of five independent experts on people of African descent to study the problem of racial discrimination faced by people of African descent.
(4) See for instance the report by Rachel Brett with the assistance of Daniel Rousselot, Emily Slatter, and Jeremy Smith, Snakes and Ladders, Report on the 58th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 8 March-26 April 2002.
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